A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING ALGORITHM FOR OPTIMIZING BASEBALL STRATEGIES
デジタルデータあり(科学技術振興機構)
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- 資料種別
- 記事
- 著者・編者
- Akifumi KiraKeisuke InakawaToshiharu Fujita
- タイトル(掲載誌)
- Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
- 巻号年月日等(掲載誌)
- 62(2):2019.4
- 掲載巻
- 62
- 掲載号
- 2
- 掲載ページ
- 64-82
- 掲載年月日(W3CDTF)
- 2019-04
- ISSN(掲載誌)
- 0453-4514
- ISSN-L(掲載誌)
- 0453-4514
- 出版事項(掲載誌)
- Tokyo : Operations Research Society of Japan
- 出版地(国名コード)
- JP
- 本文の言語コード
- eng
- 件名標目
- NDLC
- 対象利用者
- 一般
- 所蔵機関
- 国立国会図書館
- 請求記号
- Z53-M226
- 連携機関・データベース
- 国立国会図書館 : 国立国会図書館雑誌記事索引
- 書誌ID(NDLBibID)
- 029632872
- 整理区分コード
- 632
- 要約等
- <p>In this paper, baseball is formulated as a finite non-zero-sum Markov game with approximately 6.45 million states. We give an effective dynamic programming algorithm which computes equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium winning percentages for both teams in less than 2 second per game. Optimal decision making can be found depending on the situation—for example, for the batting team, whether batting for a hit, stealing a base or sacrifice bunting will maximize their win percentage, or for the fielding team, whether to pitch to or intentionally walk a batter, yields optimal results. Based on this model, we discuss whether the last-batting team has an advantage. In addition, we compute the optimal batting order, in consideration of the decision making in a game.</p>
- DOI
- 10.15807/jorsj.62.64
- オンライン閲覧公開範囲
- インターネット公開
- 連携機関・データベース
- 科学技術振興機構 : J-STAGE
- 要約等
- <p>In this paper, baseball is formulated as a finite non-zero-sum Markov game with approximately 6.45 million states. We give an effective dynamic programming algorithm which computes equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium winning percentages for both teams in less than 2 second per game. Optimal decision making can be found depending on the situation—for example, for the batting team, whether batting for a hit, stealing a base or sacrifice bunting will maximize their win percentage, or for the fielding team, whether to pitch to or intentionally walk a batter, yields optimal results. Based on this model, we discuss whether the last-batting team has an advantage. In addition, we compute the optimal batting order, in consideration of the decision making in a game.</p>
- DOI
- 10.15807/jorsj.62.64
- オンライン閲覧公開範囲
- インターネット公開
- 関連情報(URI)
- 参照
- The variance of discounted Markov decision processesOptimal threshold probability and expectation in semi-Markov decision processesThreshold probability of non-terminal type in finite horizon Markov decision processesAN APPLICATION OF A DISCRETE FIXED POINT THEOREM TO A GAME IN EXPANSIVE FORM11. Extensive Games and the Problem of InformationMinimizing a Threshold Probability in Discounted Markov Decision ProcessesDynamic ProgrammingTarget-level criterion in Markov decision processesTime Consistent Dynamic Risk MeasuresAn Offensive Earned-Run Average for BaseballOptimal threshold probability in undiscounted Markov decision processes with a target setStochastic Target Hitting Time and the Problem of Early RetirementMinimizing Risk Models in Markov Decision Processes with Policies Depending on Target ValuesStochastic GamesA Markov Chain Approach to BaseballIn Search of the "Last-Ups" Advantage in Baseball: A Game-Theoretic ApproachOptimal policy for minimizing risk models in Markov decision processesModified offensive earned-run average with steal effect for baseballModelling a baseball game to optimise pitcher substitution strategies incorporating handedness of playersA MARKOV CHAIN APPROACH TO OPTIMAL PINCH HITTING STRATEGIES IN A DESIGNATED HITTER RULE BASEBALL GAME
- 連携機関・データベース
- 国立情報学研究所 : CiNii Research
- 提供元機関・データベース
- Japan Link Center学術機関リポジトリデータベース雑誌記事索引データベースCrossrefCiNii Articles科学研究費助成事業データベース科学研究費助成事業データベース科学研究費助成事業データベース科学研究費助成事業データベース
- 書誌ID(NDLBibID)
- 029632872
- NII論文ID
- 130007636494