Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints
• 著者・編者: SHINOZAKI, Hiroki
• 著者標目: SHINOZAKI, Hiroki; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000000979338/
• 出版事項: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
• 出版年月日等: 2023-12
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2023-12
• 寄与者: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Non-obvious manipulations; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Non-quasi-linear utilities; Hard budget constraints; Package auctions
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Japan society for the Promotion of Sciences (23K18777).
• 記録形式（IMT）: application/pdf
• 一次資料へのリンクURL: fulltext; https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/81452/070_hiasDP-E-136.pdf
• オンライン閲覧公開範囲: インターネット公開
• 掲載誌: Discussion paper series ; No. HIAS-E-136
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 一橋大学 : HERMES-IR(一橋大学機関リポジトリ) : Research & Education Resources

• 要約等: We study a problem of assigning packages of objects to agents with money. We allow agents to have utility functions that exhibit income effects or fac...