Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entry Markets

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Matsumura, Toshihiroほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2012-08

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situatio...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entry Markets
Author/Editor: Matsumura, Toshihiro
Matsushima, Noriaki
Author Heading: Matsumura, Toshihiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070263324
Matsushima, Noriaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080334879
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2012-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2012-08
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 853
Volume: 853
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: network industry
access charge
manipulation of accounting
regulation
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products. The bottleneck facility holder affects the regulated input price. We investigate how vertical separation affects the incentive for manipulation and the resulting input price. We find that the results depend on whether the incumbent is the Stackelberg leader in the product market. If the incumbent cannot take leadership in the product market and faces Cournot competition, vertical separation reduces the incentive for manipulation and the resulting input price. The opposite result is derived when the incumbent can take leadership in the product market.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2012/DP0853.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華