Serial Vickrey mechanism

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Zhou, Yuほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2020-07

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect ...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository) is linked at the site of Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository).
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Serial Vickrey mechanism
Author/Editor: Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Zhou, Yu
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040807450
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2020-07
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2020-07
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 1095
Issue: 1095
Pages: 1-53
ISSN (Periodical Title): PISSN : 0473453X
EISSN : 24350982
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: The assignment market
minimum price equilibrium
general preferences
structural characterizations
Serial Vickrey mechanism
dynamic incentive compatibility
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural characterizations of minimum price equilibria and employ these results to design the ❝ Serial Vickrey mechanism,❞ that finds a minimum price equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The Serial Vickrey mechanism introduces the objects one by one, and requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times. Besides, the Serial Vickrey mechanism also has nice dynamic incentive properties.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1095.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華