Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options

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Summary, etc.：: Given an owner's noncommitment timing strategy and a manager's hidden action, we consider how the optimal compensation contract for the manager is des...

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options
Author/Editor: Hori, Keiichi
Osano, Hiroshi
Author Heading: Hori, Keiichi
Osano, Hiroshi
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Publication Date: 2011-04-08
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2011-04-08
Periodical title: KIER Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: 768
Volume: 768
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: CEO turnover
executive compensation
noncommitment
real options
severance pay
NDC: 330
Target Audience: 一般
Format (IMT): application/pdf
Source: DP768.pdf （fulltext）
http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/139434/1/DP768.pdf
Access Restrictions: インターネット公開
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 京都大学 : 京都大学学術情報リポジトリ