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Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: Experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games

Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: Experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games
紙文書・図像類
Kawamura, Tetsuya, Tse, Tiffany Tsz KwanThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2021-10Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1146p.1-31
全国の図書館

The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private

The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
紙文書・図像類
Bhaskar, V., Frechette, Guillaume R., Aoyagi, MasakiThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2015-07Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers942p.1-38
全国の図書館
  • 件名Infinitely repeated games monitoring perfect public pri...

Full Collusion with Entry and Incomplete Information

Full Collusion with Entry and Incomplete Information
デジタル文書・図像類
Patra, Ramakanta, Sekiguchi, TadashiInstitute of Economic Research, Kyoto University2021-02-04KIER Discussion Paper1055p.1-34
インターネットで読める全国の図書館

Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
紙文書・図像類
Matsushima, Hitoshi日本経済国際共同センター2007-04Discussion paper series. CIRJE-FCIRJE-F-492
全国の図書館
  • 件名... C73, D82, H41 Infinitely Repeated Games Private Monitoring Tit-For-Ta...

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