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Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: Experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games

Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: Experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games
Paper文書・図像類
Kawamura, Tetsuya, Tse, Tiffany Tsz KwanThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2021-10Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers1146p.1-31
Other Libraries in Japan

The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private

The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
Paper文書・図像類
Bhaskar, V., Frechette, Guillaume R., Aoyagi, MasakiThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University2015-07Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers942p.1-38
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Subject HeadingInfinitely repeated games monitoring perfect public pri...

Full Collusion with Entry and Incomplete Information

Full Collusion with Entry and Incomplete Information
Digital文書・図像類
Patra, Ramakanta, Sekiguchi, TadashiInstitute of Economic Research, Kyoto University2021-02-04KIER Discussion Paper1055p.1-34
Available onlineOther Libraries in Japan

Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Paper文書・図像類
Matsushima, Hitoshi日本経済国際共同センター2007-04Discussion paper series. CIRJE-FCIRJE-F-492
Other Libraries in Japan
  • Subject Heading... C73, D82, H41 Infinitely Repeated Games Private Monitoring Tit-For-Ta...

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