タイトル（掲載誌）滋賀大学経済学部Working Paper Series
一般注記type:Technical Report
This study provides empirical evidence on how ownership structure moderates the association between accounting accruals (measured by accrual quality) and abnormal audit fees. Previous research shows that auditor–client economic dependence erodes auditor independence. Most researchers focused on U.S. firms to assess the effects of audit committees or boards of directors on the association between auditor–client economic bonding and audit quality. However, alternative governance mechanisms to these firms exist in Japan and can provide a new perspective on this issue. A unique feature of Japanese company ownership structure is that stable shareholdings exist, such as financial institutions’ shareholdings and cross-shareholdings (corporate shareholdings). This governance structure is different from those found not only in the United States but also in other countries that have seen previous research on this issue, such as Australia and the United Kingdom. No research is available that focuses on how the relationship between accrual quality and abnormal audit fees are moderated by financial institutions’ shareholdings in the Japanese market. Thus, to fill this gap, this study uses the accrual-quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as a gauge for audit quality. The results demonstrate that higher audit fees are likely to compromise auditors’ independence and, thereby,result in lower audit quality. In contrast, financial institutions’ shareholdings are negatively associated with accrual quality. This result indicates that higher financial institutions’ shareholdings lead to greater accrual quality. In addition, I find an association between audit quality and abnormal audit fees, moderated by financial institutions’ shareholdings.
identifier:滋賀大学経済学部Working Paper Series, No. 216, pp. 1-52
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）