タイトル(掲載誌)CRR Discussion Paper, Series B
一般注記type:Technical Report
This paper studies the relationship between population movement and a government's long-term fiscal health. It uses an equilibrium model with dynamic optimization to investigate a situation in which a government repays its fiscal liabilities using tax revenues. The focus is on an upper bound of fiscal liability, which is compatible with a No-Ponzi-game condition. The investigation deals, in particular, with how the upper bound depends on population size,population growth rate and primary fiscal balance per person. The relative effectiveness between policy regimes are also studied.
identifier:CRR Discussion Paper, Series B, No. B-3, pp. 1-18
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)