タイトル(掲載誌)CRR Discussion Paper, Series B
一般注記type:Technical Report
This note studies the relationship between population movement and a government's long-term fiscal health. It use an equilibrium model with dynamic optimization to investigate a situation in which a government repays its fiscal liabilities using tax revenues. The focus is on an upper bound of fiscal liability, which is compatible with a No-Ponzi-game condition. The investigation deals, in particular, with how the upper bound depends on population size, population growth rate and primary fiscal balance per person.
identifier:CRR Discussion Paper, Series B, No. B-4, pp. 1-14 (No. B-3改訂版)
一次資料へのリンクURLhttps://shiga-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=9859&item_no=1&attribute_id=19&file_no=1
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)