タイトル(掲載誌)CRR Working Paper, Series A
一般注記type:Technical Report
This paper presents a theoretical framework to describe the behavior of physiciansunder the Japanese fee-for-service scheme by explicitly incorporating the behavioraldi erence between self-employed and hospital-employed physicians into the model. Theresults show that the overprovision or the underprovision of treatmens and proceduresby self-employed physicians depends on the current fee-for-service scheme with theregulated price (point) system. This study also presents that a substantial declinein the number of hospital-employed physicians results in an increase in overwork orunpaid work of hospital-employed physicians as well as in a decrease in the health levelof patients at hospital. This result could also be interpreted as a possible consequenceof the reform of the Japanese trainee programme of physicians in 2004. This paperfurthermore shows that as long as the number of patients treated by both types ofphysicians is identical, hospital-employed physicians attain lower utility with heavierworkloads but give better medical services with the higher health level of patients thanself-employed physicians do.
identifier:CRR Working Paper, Series A, No. A-12, pp. 1-[40]
一次資料へのリンクURLhttps://shiga-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=9948&item_no=1&attribute_id=19&file_no=1
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)