一般注記This paper investigates dynamic properties of environmental externalities with a framework of voluntary provision of a public good by analyzing the infinite duration dynamic game. We compare the first best solution, the open-loop solution under enforceable commitments, and the closed-loop solution without commitment. We explore the free riding problem and consider the normative role of Pigovian consumption taxes to internalize the free riding problem. We also investigate the adjustment speeds of environmental quality under alternative solutions and examine the impact of Pigovian consumption taxes on the adjustment speed.
一次資料へのリンクURLhttps://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=3861&item_no=1&attribute_id=21&file_no=1
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)
提供元機関・データベース小樽商科大学 : 小樽商科大学学術成果コレクション