タイトル（掲載誌）Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
一般注記Potential bidders respond to a seller s choice of auction mechanism for a common-value ora¢ liated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost(and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decidewhether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay an entry fee, or cease competing. Auctionrules and information ows are quite general; participation decisions may be simultaneous orsequential. The resulting revenue identity for any auction mechanism implies that optimalauctions are allocatively e¢ cient; a nontrivial reserve price is revenue-inferior. Optimal auctionsare otherwise contentless: any auction that sells without reserve becomes optimal by adjustingany one of the continuous, spanning parameters, e.g., the entry fee. Seller s surplus-extractingtools are now substitutes, not complements. Many econometric studies of auction markets areseen to be awed in their identi cation of the number of bidders.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）