Fair Contracts

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: Fair Contracts
• 著者・編者: Ishiguro, Shingo
• 著者標目: Ishiguro, Shingo; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000060288496
• 出版事項: Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2011-11
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2011-11
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 11-30
• 掲載巻: 11-30
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Moral Hazard; Incentive Contracts; Fairness
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: In this paper we present an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimalcontracts, which we call “fair contracts," in the general moral hazard model.The two main axioms we employ are incentive efficiency and no–envyness. Theincentive efficiency requires that agents of organization select the Pareto efficientcontracts among all possible incentive compatible contracts. No–envyness isequity requirement to ensure that each agent does not envy contracts of othersin the same organization. We then show that, due to the tension betweenincentive efficiency and no-envyness, fair contracts have the very simple featurethat risk averse agents are offered the fixed wage to choose only the least costlyaction.
• 掲載誌（NCID）: AA1160366X; https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/AA1160366X
• 参照（URI）: URI; http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1130.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華