タイトル（掲載誌）Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記* Revised: [07-32, 2007]
In this paper, we construct a simple dynamic two-party electoral competitionmodel in which the degree of political instability is endogenously determined. Weconsider the campaign contributions as stock variable which is gradually accumulatedby both party's direct investment and induced the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.We then examine the stability of the symmetric steady state and find thatit may be either totally stable or unstable depending on the parameter values involvedin the model. We also found that under certain conditions, at least nearthe symmetric steady state, there exists indeterminacy of equilibrium path: thereexist both stable and unstable paths, that is, under given levels of political assets,both high instability political system and low instability political system can emergedepending on expectations of political parties.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）