タイトル（掲載誌）Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記* Revised： [11-32-Rev., 2012]
This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low in- tertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing-constrained one-breadwinner cou- ples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the for- mer attain a higher bene t-to-cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two- breadwinner couples produce an inverse U-shaped relationship between the relevant variable and the tax rate.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）