タイトル（掲載誌）Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記* Revised： [13-01 , 2013]
This study experimentally investigates the interaction between firms’ information acquisition decisions and disclosure. In particular, I focus on a Cournot duopoly market under industry-wide demand uncertainty. The results demonstrate that acquiring industry-wide demand information improves firms’ production decisions in that firms can adjust their quantity levels depending on the market demand. However, disclosure diminishes a firm’s incentive to acquire such information. This is because once the information, which a firm acquired at a cost, is subsequently disclosed, a rival firm can take a free ride on the disclosed information and make a more informed decision. Hence, disclosure decreases the benefit of acquiring information for the disclosing firm. Taken together, although acquiring information improves production decisions, disclosure decreases the incentive to do so and thus, deteriorates a firm’s internal information environment. This leads to inefficient production, which in turn might have a substantial impact on market outcomes.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）