タイトル(掲載誌)Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記This paper examines the design of a tax policy applied to the consumption of durable goods and labor income. We consider cases wherein the government cannot commit to a tax policy in the second period. If the type of taxpayers is unrevealed, it is optimal to tax the durable goods consumption of a high-income earner and subsidize that of a low-income earner. On the other hand, when the type of taxpayers is revealed, imposing a positive tax rate on a high-income earner’s durable goods consumption is desirable. This implies that the government should design taxes on durable goods consumption to be progressive and supplement its optimal tax policies.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)