タイトル（掲載誌）Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記Why do well-established companies often lose managerial fidelity due to corporate scandals, and how do they restructure management to recover from corporate failures? In this study, we present a dynamic theory of management cycles by which firms endogenously switch between different management regimes over time. Firms accumulate managerial capital as intangible assets such as managerial knowledge, know-how, and skills over time. We show that current managers of a firm are disciplined by not only how much managerial capital accumulated through the prior business operations within the firm, but also by the market valuation about future profitability of the firm. Through such dynamic interactions, we show that management cycles endogenously emerge and persist over time.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）