The Winner-Take-All Dilemma

• 資料種別: 規格・テクニカルリポート類
• タイトル: The Winner-Take-All Dilemma
• 著者・編者: Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio
• 著者標目: Kikuchi, Kazuya; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010732448; Koriyama, Yukio
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2019-12
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2019-12
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 1059
• 掲載巻: 1059
• 掲載ページ: 1-37
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Representative democracy; winner-take-all rule; proportional rule
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: June 2019. Revised December 2019.; This paper considers collective decision-making when individuals are partitioned into groups (e.g., states or parties) endowed with voting weights. We study a game in which each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. We show that under quite general conditions, the game is a Prisoner's Dilemma: while the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, the equilibrium is Pareto dominated. We also show asymptotic Pareto dominance of the proportional rule. Our numerical computation for the US Electoral College verifies the sensibility of the asymptotic results.
• 参照（URI）: comment:URI; https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1059R.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華