タイトル(掲載誌)Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
一般注記November 2019. Revised April 2020. Secondary Revised December 2020.
We analyze firms' decisions to adopt a vertical integration or separation, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains, where upstream sectors conduct R&D investment. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has knowledge and R&D spillovers on the rivals' costs. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, spillover, and incentives in innovation interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)