Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity : Leading Examples

• 資料種別: 文書・図像類
• タイトル: Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity : Leading Examples
• 著者・編者: Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• 著者標目: Zhou, Yu; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040807450; Serizawa, Shigehiro; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
• 出版事項: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2021-01
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2021-01
• タイトル（掲載誌）: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: 1116
• 掲載巻: 1116
• 掲載ページ: 1-21
• ISSN（掲載誌）: PISSN : 0473453X; EISSN : 24350982
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: Multi-object auction; minimum price equilibrium; exam-ples; quasi-linear utility functions; general utility functions
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents’ utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit ele-gant e¢ ciency and incentive-compatibility. These auctions are conjured to preserve their properties beyond quasi-linearity. Nevertheless, we exemplify that with general utility functions, these auctions fail to identify the MPEs and are substantially ine¢ cient and manipulatable. The implications of our negative results for multi-object auction models with agents with multi-unit demand, and matching with contracts models are also discussed.
• 参照（URI）: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2021/DP1116.pdf; URI
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華