タイトル(掲載誌)Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記This paper discusses what determines the reference point in decision making, using an em- pirical dataset of performance stats in professional baseball. Previous literature has argued that some round-numbers may work as such points, and as a result, bunching occurs around these numbers in the distribution of the target outcomes. On the other hand, in the setting of work- place, the outcomes are observable both for the worker (players) and the evaluator (managers). This paper shows that this bunching do NOT occur from the structure of the contracts, or how the managers evaluate the players. Bunching seems to stem from the reference-point dependence of the workers themselves, and so to avoid this economically inefficient behavior, we have to design contracts that incentivize players to do so.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)