Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes

• 資料種別: 規格・テクニカルリポート類
• タイトル: Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes
• 著者・編者: Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro
• 著者標目: Murooka, Takeshi; https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000010796345; Yamashita, Takuro
• 出版事項: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
• 出版年月日等: 2021-09
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2021-09
• タイトル（掲載誌）: OSIPP Discussion Paper
• 巻号年月日等（掲載誌）: DP-2021-E-006
• 掲載巻: DP-2021-E-006
• 掲載ページ: 1-38
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 件名標目: adverse selection; inferential naivety; mechanism design; behavioral contract theory; consumer protection
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: We study an adverse selection environment, where a rational seller can trade a good of which she privately knows its value to a buyer, and there are gains from trade. The buyer's types differ in their degree of inferential abilities: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from the seller's offer, whereas a naive type under-appreciates the correlation between the seller's private information and offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the social surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is (in particular, even when no trade is the unique possible outcome if all agents are rational), all types of buyers trade in the optimal mechanism. The rational buyer's trade occurs at the expense of the naive buyer's losses. We also investigate a consumer-protection policy of limiting the losses and discuss its implications.
• 参照（URI）: comment:URI; http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E006.pdf
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）; https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
• 提供元機関・データベース: 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫 桜華