タイトル(掲載誌)Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
一般注記This study investigates mixed markets in which a social welfare-maximizing public firm and a private firm engage in behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD). Total of two cases are considered: one where domestic shareholders completely own the private firm and one where foreign shareholders completely own it. In the domestic mixed duopoly, BBPD is irrelevant from the viewpoint of social welfare. This is because poaching does not occur. In the international mixed duopoly, BBPD improves domestic social welfare, as it allows the public firm to lower its poaching price. In both cases, privatization is more undesirable under BBPD than uniform pricing.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)