タイトル(掲載誌)Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
一般注記This paper characterizes optimal fiscal rules within a model integrating fiscal rule deviations in a two-period political turnover framework. The incumbent party aims to secure favored spending through increased debt issuance due to potential power loss. The study introduces spending and deviation rules, requiring legislative approval for deviations from the spending rule. Analysis shows the optimal deviation rule, favoring flexible responses to stringent spending rules. Furthermore, larger initial debt balances warrant tighter spending rules, while the optimal deviation rule remains unaffected. Additionally, political conflict influences deviation rule permissiveness, aligning more with the incumbent party’s preferences as conflicts escalate.
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)