タイトル(掲載誌)CARLS series of advanced study of logic and sensibility
一般注記type:text
It is well known that the two philosophers who stand at the beginning of the tradition of phenomenology, namely Brentano and Husserl, aimed to describe the essential structure of our conscious experiences. Although the influence of the teacher to the pupil cannot be denied, there are plenty of disagreements between them, too. Among such disagreements, particularly interesting for me is the opposition between them concerning the correct part-whole structure of the phenomenon called judgment. And the aim of this paper is to examine the nature and possible source of that opposition.
I proceed as follows. First, I explain the opposition at issue (1). Next, I present an objection to Brentano's view from the side of Husserl (2). Then, I consider the question of how Brentano could maintain his view despite the obviousness of the objection, and suggest that the opposition concerning the structure of judgment can be understood as stemming from a general mereological opposition between mereological actualism and potentialism (3).
Part 4 : Philosophy and Anthoropology
一次資料へのリンクURLhttps://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/download.php?koara_id=KO12002001-20090331-0369
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース(IRDB)(機関リポジトリ)