Portfolio allocation as leadership strategy : bargaining among and within parties

• 資料種別: 図書
• タイトル: Portfolio allocation as leadership strategy : bargaining among and within parties
• 著者・編者: by Yoshikuni Ono.
• 著者標目: Ono, Yoshikuni.
• 出版事項: Ann Arbor, MI : UMI
• 出版年月日等: [2010]
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2010
• 数量: ix, 129 pages
• 大きさ: 23 cm
• 授与機関名: University of Michigan
• 授与年月日（W3CDTF）: 2010
• 学位: Ph.D.
• 出版地（国名コード）: US
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 表現種別: text
• 機器種別: unmediated
• キャリア種別: volume
• 件名標目: coalition government; cabinet; Political Science; Social Sciences
• NDLC: A56-Z
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 一般注記: Authorized facsimile, made from the microfilm master copy of the original dissertation or master thesis published by UMI.; UMI number: 3406269.
• 資料の内容に関する注記: In parliamentary democracies, cabinet ministers hold very important positions because they make policies and oversee the implementation of policy on behalf of the government. This dissertation introduces a theoretical framework that accounts for the allocation of cabinet portfolios as a product of a prime minister’s “political strategy.” The prime minister is concerned about productive policy-making as well as the long-term survival of the government. These concerns affect the bargains that the prime minister will choose to strike with potential and existing coalition partners. From this theoretical framework, I develop a game-theoretic model that articulates the circumstances under which the prime minister of a coalition government is likely to surrender various numbers of portfolios. I then evaluate the model’s predictions by drawing on data from coalition governments in thirteen Western European countries.; The empirical work demonstrates that the prime minister uses portfolio allocation as an instrument to defuse tensions among coalition partners as well as to reward them for joining the ruling coalition. I find that the prime minister’s party surrenders more portfolios not only as its bargaining power in assembling a coalition declines, but also as the policy preferences of coalition partners become more divergent. Since bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties, I further extend my theoretical framework to explain portfolio allocation among party factions. Party leaders decide how to allocate portfolios among their party’s members, but many do so while cognizant of internal divisions among their party’s factions. To explore how the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within parties, I examine an important case in Japan where the long tenure in power of the Liberal Democratic Party allows us to investigate systematic variation in allocation outcomes.^; The empirical findings suggest that substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes
• コレクション（個別）: 日本関係外国語図書
• 一次資料へのリンクURL: Item Resolution URL; http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75937
• 所蔵機関: 国立国会図書館
• 請求記号: A56-Z-B27
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立国会図書館 : 国立国会図書館蔵書; https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp
• 書誌ID（NDLBibID）: 024642564; http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/024642564
• 目録規則: RDA
• 整理区分コード: 211