一般注記Authorized facsimile, made from the microfilm master copy of the original dissertation or master thesis published by UMI.
UMI number: 3458918.
資料の内容に関する注記The Japanese economy outperformed those of all other OECD countries before 1990 and was outperformed by most after the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. Japan subsequently implemented extensive institutional changes aiming to abandon its once renowned “Japan model” and to be “more like the US.” Such a dramatic reversal of fortunes provides policymakers and social scientists with a rich pool of data that can be analyzed to explore the effect of institutions and institutional changes on economic performance. This study analyzes the Japanese political economy since the 1990s and examines how and to what extent extensive institutional changes affect economic performance. By extending studies of transitional economies, a “death valley curve of institutional change” is deduced to show that even ideal institutional changes invite loss of institutional complementarities, resulting in serious output fall during periods of transition.^
Hypotheses are tested against panel data of 70 industries from 1990 to 2005. They are also tested and elaborated through detailed historical analysis. Results of statistical and historical analyses indicate that political and financial embeddedness to the “Japan model” induced enduring negative industrial outputs. They concurrently show that industries that abandoned the “Japan model” promptly also suffered a decline in industrial outputs. During the quick transition, institutional complementarities were lost. These results illustrate the complex nature of the effect of institutional changes on economic performance and imply the existence of a “death valley curve of institutional change.” These findings advance our understandings of divergent institutional settings across national borders. They can add dynamism to both the legal origins theory in economics and the “varieties of capitalism” framework in comparative politics.^
If the “death valley curve of institutional change” is deep and wide, the probability of “varieties of cap