Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

• 資料種別: 図書
• ISBN: 9780198832775 (hbk.); 019883277X (hbk.); 9780198832782 (pbk.); 0198832788 (pbk.)
• タイトル: Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe
• 著者・編者: Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young.
• 版: First Edition.
• シリーズタイトル: Oxford studies in democratization
• タイトル標目: Oxford studies in democratization.
• 著者標目: Mares, Isabela.; Young, Lauren E.
• 出版事項: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press (出版)
• 出版年月日等: 2019.
• 出版年（W3CDTF）: 2019
• 数量: xii, 321 pages
• 形態の詳細: illustrations, maps
• 大きさ: 24 cm.
• 並列タイトル等: Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe
• 出版地（国名コード）: GB
• 本文の言語コード: eng
• 表現種別: text
• 機器種別: unmediated
• キャリア種別: volume
• 件名標目: Elections--Corrupt practices--Europe, Eastern.; Elections--Corrupt practices.; Politics and government.; Hungary--Politics and government--1989-; Romania--Politics and government--1989-; Eastern Europe.; Hungary.; Romania.
• LCC: JN2183
• DDC: 324.6/609439 $2 23
• NDLC: A251
• 対象利用者: 一般
• 資料の内容に関する注記: In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? 'Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe' uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning, including vote buying and electoral coercion, persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy.
• 書誌注記: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• 所蔵機関: 国立国会図書館
• 請求記号: A251-D4
• 連携機関・データベース: 国立国会図書館 : 国立国会図書館蔵書; https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp
• 書誌ID（NDLBibID）: 029936144; http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/029936144
• LC control number: 2019946758; https://lccn.loc.gov/2019946758
• OCLC番号: 1124995970; https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1124995970
• 目録規則: RDA
• 整理区分コード: 211