一般注記Includes bibliographical references (p. [201]-205) and index
Summary: "This book provides a systematic reading of Martin Heidegger's project of "fundamental ontology", which he initially presented in Being and Time (1927) and developed further in his work on Kant. It shows our understanding of being to be that of a small set of a priori, temporally inflected, 'categorial' forms that articulate what, how, and whether things can be. As selves bound to and bounded by the world within which we seek to answer the question of how to live, we imaginatively generate these forms in order to open ourselves up to those intra-worldly entities which determinately instantiate them. This makes us, as selves, the source and unifying ground of being, even as this ground is hidden from us-until we do fundamental ontology. In showing how Heidegger develops these ideas, the author challenges key elements of the anti-Cartesian framework that most readers bring to his texts, arguing that his Kantian account of being has its roots in the anti-empiricism and Augustinianism of Descartes, ... "
関連情報Routledge research in phenomenology
掲載誌Routledge research in phenomenology
連携機関・データベース国立情報学研究所 : CiNii Research
NACSIS書誌ID(NCID)https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BC05096708 : BC05096708