Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement
Author/Editor: Sato, Meg
Author Heading: Sato, Meg
Publication, Distribution, etc.: 日本経済国際共同センター
Publication Date: 2013-06
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2013-06
Periodical title: Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
No. or year of volume/issue: CIRJE-F-890
Volume: CIRJE-F-890
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Moral Hazard
Managerial Replacement
Stock-based Compensation
Long-term Vested Options
Short-term Vested Options
Journal of Economic Literature Classi cations: D86, G32, G34, M12, M52.
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): application/pdf
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
Related Material (URI): URI
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf890ab.html
Periodical Title (NCID): AA11450569
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/AA11450569
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 東京大学 : 東京大学学術機関リポジトリ