The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Shinotsuka, Tomoichiほか

Publisher: 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター

Publication date: 2001-10

Material Format: Digital

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NDC: 331.19

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Note (General)：: In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are "absolutely powerful" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction oper...

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Otaru University of Commerce Academic Collections
Otaru University of Commerce Academic Collections
Digital
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ） is linked at the site of 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）.
Otaru University of Commerce Academic Collections

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Digital

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Author/Editor: Shinotsuka, Tomoichi
Takamiya, Koji
Author Heading: Shinotsuka, Tomoichi
Takamiya, Koji
Publication, Distribution, etc.: 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター
Publication Date: 2001-10
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2001-10
Periodical title: Discussion paper series
No. or year of volume/issue: 74
Volume: 74
Pages: 1-18
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: 経済学
NDC: 331.19
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are "absolutely powerful" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power. We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination, and Exclusion.
Source: https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=3689&item_no=1&attribute_id=21&file_no=1
https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=3689&item_no=1&attribute_id=21&file_no=1
Access Restrictions: 限定公開
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 小樽商科大学 : 小樽商科大学学術成果コレクション