Rent-Seeking Behavior in the War of Attrition

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Itaya, Jun-ichiほか

Publisher: 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター

Publication date: 1997-10

Material Format: Digital

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NDC: 331.84

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Note (General)：: The object of this paper is to reexamine possible non-existence of Cournet-Nash equilibrium using the war of attrition, when there are increasing retu...

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Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Rent-Seeking Behavior in the War of Attrition
Author/Editor: Itaya, Jun-ichi
Sano, Hiroyuki
Author Heading: Itaya, Jun-ichi
Sano, Hiroyuki
Publication, Distribution, etc.: 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター
Publication Date: 1997-10
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 1997-10
Periodical title: Discussion paper series
No. or year of volume/issue: 43
Volume: 43
Pages: 1-28
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: 経済学
NDC: 331.84
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): The object of this paper is to reexamine possible non-existence of Cournet-Nash equilibrium using the war of attrition, when there are increasing returns to rent-seeking expenditures. In our multi-person, multi-period model based on the war of attrition, each player, in addition to determining rent-seeking expenditures, plays a mixed strategy as to stay in or exit from rent-seeking competition in each period in a situation where his or her expected payoff from rent-seeking is negative. In such a setting the number of players is endogeneously determined over time so that surviving rent-seekers end up earning nonnegative expected payoffs in the long-run. We also conduct comparative statics analysis with respect to the degree of increasing returns to expenditures, the discount factor and the size of prize on the probability of exiting as well as on rent-seeking expenditures. In particular, we show that a decrease in the degree of increasing returns to expenditures on rent-seeking will increase social costs, contrary to the static Tullock model with a fixed number of players.
Access Restrictions: 限定公開
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 小樽商科大学 : 小樽商科大学学術成果コレクション