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Bibliographic Record
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- Material Type
- 文書・図像類
- Author/Editor
- 宮川,敏治
- Author Heading
- Text Language Code
- eng
- Subject Heading
- Target Audience
- 一般
- Note (General)
- type:80 大阪経大学会「Working Paper」We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (SPBE) of a non-cooperative bargaining game model in which all types of proposers offer the ex post efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible, budget-balanced mechanism with the full "residual" surplus extraction property. We define the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) under incomplete information which is realized as the limit of SPBEs when the risk of breakdown is vanishing. We also show that such a convergence result does not necessarily hold because of incomplete information.
- Source
- http://www.i-repository.net/il/user_contents/02/G0000031Repository/workingpaper/wp2012-2.pdf
- Access Restrictions
- 限定公開