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Bibliographic Record
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- Material Type
- 文書・図像類
- Author/Editor
- 宮川,敏治
- Author Heading
- Text Language Code
- eng
- Target Audience
- 一般
- Note (General)
- type:80 大阪経大学会「Working Paper」We study a political game developed by Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) consisting of three players. Each player has an exogenous political power, which is weak or strong. We characterize "politically stable" wealth allocations which have no coalitional deviation to appropriate the wealth of outside players. These locations are defined as the cores under complete and asymmetric information about their political powers. The core under asymmetric information is a variation of the credible core in Dutta and Vohra (2005). The heterogeneity of players' types pro-duces political stability under complete information and the existence of weak-type players contributes to that under asymmetric information.
- Source
- http://www.i-repository.net/il/user_contents/02/G0000031Repository/workingpaper/wp2013-5.pdf
- Access Restrictions
- 限定公開