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- Material Type
- 文書・図像類
- Author/Editor
- 黒坂,真
- Author Heading
- Text Language Code
- eng
- Target Audience
- 一般
- Note (General)
- type:80 大阪経大学会「Working Paper」This paper analyzes the gift exchange phenomenon in a communist dictatorship from the standpoint of resource allocation efficiency. As is well-known, those who liv in a communist dictatorship are required to praise their dictator as the supreme excellent leader of the world revolutionary movement. According to the communist theory, the leader of the communist party knows the law for the development of human society, and it indicates that it is an honourable deed for people to praise their excellent leader of the communist party and to obey his orders. Then, the leader of the communist party becomes the dictator. The dictator, who has the power to allocate many types of resources, remunerates the people who praise him in many ways. We interpret this behaviour as the gift exchange, because the people who have praised the dictator to a great extent are given a higher wage or higher social position by the dictator. This phenomenon is particularly evident in North Korea. In North Korea, the policy of giving presents to the cadre by the dictator had long been performed by Kim Jong Il. The analysis shows that the equilibrium level of production labour by the cadre increases with the dictator’s minimum level of consumption, labour endowment of the cadre, the real wage of the people, and consumption preferences of the dictator. Further, the equilibrium level of production labour by the cadre decreases with the productivity of the people, the share of production of the dictator, and labor endowment of the people. As for social welfare, an increase in productivity of the cadre has an ambiguous effect on social welfare in a communist dictatorship, as it decreases production labour by the cadre. A communist dictatorship is essentially inefficient because it allocates some labour of the cadre to adoration of the dictator. Such labour does not contribute to production of goods.
- Access Restrictions
- 限定公開
- Data Provider (Database)
- 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）