A Maximal Domain for Stragegy-proof and No-vetoer Rules in the Multi-object Choice Model

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Hatsumi, Kantaroほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2013-02

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: April 2011, Revised February 2013Following Barber?a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functio...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: A Maximal Domain for Stragegy-proof and No-vetoer Rules in the Multi-object Choice Model
Author/Editor: Hatsumi, Kantaro
Berga, Dolors
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Hatsumi, Kantaro
Berga, Dolors
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2013-02
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2013-02
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 809
Volume: 809
Pages: 1-4
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: social choice
mechanism design
voting by committees
generalized median voter scheme
separable preference
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): April 2011, Revised February 2013
Following Barber?a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy proofness and no-vetoer.
Related Material (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0809R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華