Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Morimoto, Shuhei

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2011-11

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses apro...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules in Economies with One Public Good
Author/Editor: Morimoto, Shuhei
Author Heading: Morimoto, Shuhei
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050614145
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2011-11
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2011-11
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 823
Volume: 823
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: public good
probabilistic rule
stochastic dominance relation
strategy-proofness
minimally rich domain
maximal domain
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an intervalof the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses aprobability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigatestrategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions arecompared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimallyrich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized medianrules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) bymeans of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence ofsd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoercondition. We establish that the domain of “convex" preferences is the uniquemaximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0823.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華