Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Hatsumi, Kentaroほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2009-02

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: ISER discussion paperMarch 2007 Revised July 2008 Revised February 2009We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods
Author/Editor: Hatsumi, Kentaro
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Hatsumi, Kentaro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040633417
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2009-02
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2009-02
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 686
Volume: 686
Pages: 1-29
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: allotment problem
coalitional strategy-proofness
homogeneous indivisible goods
single-peaked preference
uniform probabilistic rule
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): ISER discussion paper
March 2007 Revised July 2008 Revised February 2009
We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann- Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0686-RR.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華