Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Ogawa, Ryo

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2011-05

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: January 2010, Revised June 2010, Secondly revised May 2011We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has ...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Only the Final Outcome Matters : Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
Author/Editor: Ogawa, Ryo
Author Heading: Ogawa, Ryo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050533204
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2011-05
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2011-05
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 767
Volume: 767
Pages: 1-24
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: dynamic moral hazard
history dependence
simple contract
first-order stochastic dominance
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): January 2010, Revised June 2010, Secondly revised May 2011
We analyze a dynamic principal–agent problem in which the agent’s effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal’s optimization problem. The paper also discusses that the optimality of such a simple payment scheme crucially depends on the first-order stochastic dominance of the final outcome under various effort sequences.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2010/DP0767RR.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華