A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Tamura, Wataru

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2012-01

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: The 14th ISER-Moriguchi Prize (2011) Awarded PaperWe study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed rec...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure
Author/Editor: Tamura, Wataru
Author Heading: Tamura, Wataru
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000060711950
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2012-01
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2012-01
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 828
Volume: 828
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: information disclosure
semidefinite programming
linear transformation
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): The 14th ISER-Moriguchi Prize (2011) Awarded Paper
We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers’ actions a?ect the sender’s utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender’s expected utility is written as the expected value of a quadratic function of those conditional expectations, we identify conditions under which full and no disclosure is optimal for the sender and show that a linear transformation of the state is optimal if it is normally distributed. We apply our theory to advertising, political campaigning, and monetary policy.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2012/DP0828.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華