Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Ishida, Junichiro

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2012-03

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, s...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments
Author/Editor: Ishida, Junichiro
Author Heading: Ishida, Junichiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000040324222
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2012-03
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2012-03
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 838
Volume: 838
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Sabotage
Tournament
Fast track
Late selection
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents’ incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which these two schemes arise in a unified framework.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2012/DP0838.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華