The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Masuda, Takehitoほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2013-09

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: May 2013. Revised September 2013.We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Playe...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally
Author/Editor: Masuda, Takehito
Okano, Yoshitaka
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Author Heading: Masuda, Takehito
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080725060
Okano, Yoshitaka
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020513120
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000020205628
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2013-09
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2013-09
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 874
Volume: 874
Pages: 1-4
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Public good experiment
Approval mechanism
Multiple implementation
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): May 2013. Revised September 2013.
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM multiply implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects’ responses to the questionnaire revealed the heterogeneity of reasoning processes to be consistent with the model.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0874R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華