Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Aoyagi, Masaki

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2014-05

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: September 2013, Revised May 2014Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities
Author/Editor: Aoyagi, Masaki
Author Heading: Aoyagi, Masaki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000050314430
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2014-05
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2014-05
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 884
Volume: 884
Pages: 1-45
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: graphs
networks
externalities
Bertrand
divide and conquer
discriminatory pricing
monopolization
segmentation
two-sided market
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): September 2013, Revised May 2014
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the class of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market,or the two sellers segment the market.
References (URI): https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0884R.pdf
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2013/DP0884R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華