Endogenous Information Acquisition and Partial Announcement Policy

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Arato, Hirokiほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2014-04

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: January 2014. Revised April 2014We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contes...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Endogenous Information Acquisition and Partial Announcement Policy
Author/Editor: Arato, Hiroki
Hori, Takeo
Nakamura, Tomoya
Author Heading: Arato, Hiroki
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090583518
Hori, Takeo
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000080547513
Nakamura, Tomoya
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070706928
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2014-04
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2014-04
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 892
Volume: 892
Pages: 1-21
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Beauty contest games
Endogenous information acquisition
Transparency of information
Partial announcement policy
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): January 2014. Revised April 2014
We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contest where agents’ actions are strategic complements and where their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. The following results are obtained: i) if the authorities sell public information at a constant price, multiple equilibria emerge and a partial announcement equilibrium is unstable; ii) here exist pricing rules that ensure the uniqueness and stability of mixed strategy equilibria, which indicates that a partial announcement policy can be implemented; iii) the optimal price of public information rises as its precision increases relative to private information; iv) the optimal price is independent of the degree of strategic complementarity.
References (URI): URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0892R.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華