Advertisement versus Motivation in Competitive Search Equilibrium

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Takii, Katsuya

Publisher: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Publication date: 2014-12-26

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We analyze equilibrium wage contracts in a competitive search model where a firm motivates workers to invest in a match-specific skill. If skill is no...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Advertisement versus Motivation in Competitive Search Equilibrium
Author/Editor: Takii, Katsuya
Author Heading: Takii, Katsuya
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000070346138
Publication, Distribution, etc.: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2014-12-26
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2014-12-26
Periodical title: OSIPP Discussion Paper
No. or year of volume/issue: DP-2014-E-009
Volume: DP-2014-E-009
Pages: 1-45
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Search Theory
Incentive
Advertisement
Specific Skill
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We analyze equilibrium wage contracts in a competitive search model where a firm motivates workers to invest in a match-specific skill. If skill is not critical for production, the contract is first best. If critical, the contract coincides with an efficiency wage contract and cannot attain even second best. Unlike standard efficiency wage models, the wage plays a dual role, advertisement and motivation, which induces a novel source of inefficiency: the competition to attract workers forces a wage to be chosen that increases the ex ante utility of workers at the expense of ex post utility.
References (URI): URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2014/DP2014E009.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華