Characterizing Minimal Impartial Rules for Awarding Prizes

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Tamura, Shohei

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2015-01

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: The 17th ISER-Moriguchi Prize (2014) Awarded PaperWe study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nomina...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Characterizing Minimal Impartial Rules for Awarding Prizes
Author/Editor: Tamura, Shohei
Author Heading: Tamura, Shohei
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2015-01
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2015-01
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 925
Volume: 925
Pages: 1-13
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Institutional design
Award rule
Con ict of interest
Impartiality
Plurality correspondence
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): The 17th ISER-Moriguchi Prize (2014) Awarded Paper
We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0925.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華