Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment : Impossibility Theorems

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Kondo, Hikaruほか

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2015-03

Material Format: Paper

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Note (General)：: We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition...

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Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment : Impossibility Theorems
Author/Editor: Kondo, Hikaru
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Author Heading: Kondo, Hikaru
Serizawa, Shigehiro
https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000090252717
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2015-03
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2015-03
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 927
Volume: 927
Pages: 1-12
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: impartiality
anonymity
indivisible goods
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents’ names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in this model, we introduce weaker variants, “anonymity on distinct preferences,” “pairwise-anonymity on distinct preferences,” “pairwise-anonymity on distinct profiles,” and “independence of others’ permutations.” We show that for more than two agents and two objects, no rule is pairwise-anonymous on distinct preferences and Pareto-efficient (Theorem 1), no rule is pairwise-anonymous on distinct preferences and independent of others’ permutations (Theorem 2), and no rule is pairwise-anonymous on distinct profiles and strategy-proof (Theorem 3). These results suggest that introducing randomization to object allocation problems is almost inevitable for achieving impartiality.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0927.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華