Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money

Material type: 文書・図像類

Author: Hashimoto, Kazuhiko

Publisher: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Publication date: 2015-04

Material Format: Paper

Capacity, size, etc.: -

NDC: -

View All

Notes on use

Note (General)：: We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new...

Search by Bookstore

Holdings of Libraries in Japan

This page shows libraries in Japan other than the National Diet Library that hold the material.

List of Cooperating Institutions and Databases

Please contact your local library for information on how to use materials or whether it is possible to request materials from the holding libraries.

other

OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)
Paper
You can check the holdings of institutions and databases with which Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository) is linked at the site of Institutional Repositories DataBase(IRDB)(Institutional Repository).
OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive)

Search by Bookstore

Bibliographic Record

You can check the details of this material, its authority (keywords that refer to materials on the same subject, author's name, etc.), etc.

Paper

Material Type: 文書・図像類
Title: Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money
Author/Editor: Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Author Heading: Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Publication, Distribution, etc.: The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Publication Date: 2015-04
Publication Date (W3CDTF): 2015-04
Periodical title: Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
No. or year of volume/issue: 931
Volume: 931
Pages: 1-39
Text Language Code: eng
Subject Heading: Strategy-proofness
Probabilistic allocation problem
Second price trading rule
Budget-balance
Second best efficiency
Target Audience: 一般
Note (General): We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1) strategy-proofness, “budget-balance", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (2) strategy-proofness, “equal rights lower bound", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (3) strategy-proofness, “envy-freeness, no-trade-no-transfer", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability.
References (URI): URI
http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0931.pdf
Data Provider (Database): 国立情報学研究所 : 学術機関リポジトリデータベース（IRDB）（機関リポジトリ）
https://irdb.nii.ac.jp
Original Data Provider (Database): 大阪大学 : 大阪大学学術情報庫　桜華